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THE MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
have failed to record it. The purpose of such statutes can be perfectly
accomplished without giving them a collateral result which protects
fraud feasers from liability." WILLIAM EVANS.
Municipal Corporations-Liability for Extras Furnished With-
out Compliance with Statutory Mode of Contracting.-In Probst v.
City of Menasha, 45 Wis. 90, 13 N.W. (2d) 504 (1944) the defendant
city made contract with plaintiff contractor for the construction and re-
pair of sidewalk, which contract obligated the contractor to furnish
sufficient filling to bring subgrade to proper level. The contract was
entered into in compliance with Sec. 62.15' laying down the mode of
entering into municipal contracts for public works. However, at the
direction of the city engineer the contractor furnished extra filling of
sand, and a committee of the common council which worked with the
city engineer knew of the directions. It was held that the city could
make itself liable on contract only in compliance with statutory provi-
sions; that neither the city engineer nor the street committee had au-
thority to modify the terms of the contract between the contractor and
the city, and that the city did not become liable for the extra filling on
principle of unjust enrichment.
In L. G. Arnold Inc. v. City of Hudson,2 the plaintiff sought to re-
cover for additional work under an amended contract without addi-
tional compensation being included. In denying recovery the court said,
We have found no decision of this court in which it has been
held that a city may incur municipal liability by estoppel where
the applicable mandatory statutes have not been complied with.
The whole tenor of our decisions has been to require municipal
corporations implicitly to obey the law in regard to letting of con-
tracts or to incurring municipal liability and to deny to claim-
ants against municipalities recoveries unless the law relating to
the making of municipal contracts has been fully complied with.
Bechtold and another v. City of Wauwatosa and others,3 a taxpayers
action to enjoin the city from paying on a contract entered into with
the Federal Paving Corporation held that a municipality has no power
to make contracts for public improvements unless if proceeds in the
manner prescribed by law and that a contract entered into without com-
I WIs. STAT. (1915), Sec. 62.15(1). All public work the estimated cost of which
shall exceed $500 shall be let by contract to the lowest responsible bidder; all
other public work shall be let as the council may direct. The council may also
by a vote of 2/3 of all the members elect provide by ordinance that any class
of public work or any part thereof may be done directly by the city without
submitting the same for bids.
2 L. G. Arnold Inc. v. City of Hudson, 215 Wis. 5, 254 N.W. 108 (19341.
3 Bechtold, and another v. City of Wauwatosa, and others, 228 Wis. 544, 227
N.W. 657 (1938).
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plying with its charter provisions is void in its inception and cannot be
validated by performance.
In Federal Paving Corp. v. City of Wauwatosa,4 the plaintiff sought
the reasonable value for the work done under the void contract. The
court held, denying recovery, that the city may not by waiver, ratifica-
tion, or acts ordinarily amounting to estoppel give vitality to the void
contract or become bound upon principles of restitution. The conclu-
sion is inevitable that an action based on principles of quasi-contracts
or restitution will not lie.
Some jurisdictions hold a municipality liable upon implied contract
for the reasonable value of benefits which have been received by the
municipality under a contract illegal because the contract was not made
in conformity with the Constitution or the statutes of the state, or the
charter provisions of the city. Such jurisdictions maintain that while
such contracts are void and no recovery is permitted thereon, common
honesty and fair dealing require that a municipality should not be per-
mitted to receive benefits of money, property, or services without pay-
ing just compensation therefor.5
It is to be noted that recovery on implied contracts is not allowed
because of mere benefit to the municipality, recovery being limited to
cases where there would have been a recovery upon an express con-
tract.6 Other jurisdictions allow recovery upon ratification if the munic-
ipal corporation could have made the contract in the first instance!
Such ratification may be by silence, by accepting the benefits or by
express ratification by the proper authorities having the power to make
the express contract in the first instance. Some jurisdictions allow a
recovery upon the doctrine of estoppel as such doctrine would be ap-
plied to an individual, had the corporation been an individual.8 Recov-
ery upon the theory of quantum meruit is also allowed.9
Recovery in all these instances is allowed providing the contract is
not void, illegal, ultra vires, or malum prohibitum. These jurisdictions
hold that mere irregularities in letting the contract do not make the
contract void.
4Federal Paving Corp. v. City of Wauwatosa, 231 Wis. 655, 286 N.W. 546(1939).
5 Sluder v. City of San Antonio, Tex. Comm. App., 2 S.W. (2d) 841 (1928);
City of Houston v. Finn, 139 Texts 111, 161 S.W. (2d) 776 (1942).6Logansport v. Cykerman, 116 Ind. 15, 17 N.E. 587 (1888) ; Kramrath v. Albany,
127 N.Y. 575, 28 N.E. 400 (1891) ; Wilson v. City of Mitchell, 17 S.D. 515, 97
N.W. 741 (1903).7 Stainer v. Polk County, 40 Ore. 124, 66 Pac. 707 (1901) ; Denver v. Webber,
15 Colo. App. 511, 63 Pac. 804 (1900); Lucier v. Manchester, 80 N.H. 361,
117 Atl. 286 (1922).
8 City of Mt. Vernon v. State, 71 Ohio 428, 73 N.E. 515 (1915).
9 Schiari v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 40 F. Supp. 184 (D.D.Md.
1941); Western Chemical Co. v. Lancaster County, 130 Neb. 550, 164 N.W.
699 (1936).
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Wisconsin takes the position that if the irregularity of the method
of entering into a contract is such as to deprive the municipality of the
protection of a safeguard against the extravagance or corruption of its
officers, and failure to comply with the statutory mode of entering into
the contract, makes the contract void, and recovery either on the con-
tract or on principle of unjust enrichment must be denied."0
ERWIN KAROW.
10 Federal Paving Corp. v. City of Wauwatosa, supra.
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